, in 2010, out of 52 middle-income countries, 38 were "lower middle-income" with per capita GDP between $2,000 and $7,250, and 14 were "upper middle-income" with per capita GDP between $7,250 and $11,750. Per the study, a lower middle-income country "has to attain an average growth rate of per capita income of at least 4.7 percent per annum to avoid falling into the lower middle-income trap," and an upper middle-income country "has to attain an average growth rate of per capita income of at least 3.5 percent per annum to avoid falling into the upper middle-income trap" (ibid.: 1). The study found that 35 out of the 52 middle-income countries were in the middleincome trap --specifically, 30 have been in the lower middle-income trap for over 28 years, while five have been in the upper middle-income trap for over 14 years (ibid.: 1). However, eight out of the remaining seventeen middle-income countries not in the trap in 2010 are at risk of falling into the trap --three into the lower middle-income trap and five into the upper middle-income trap (ibid.: 1). As Figure 1 demonstrates, moving up from middle-income to high-income is difficult, with only a handful of countries successfully making the jump since 1960.
Caught in the Trap: Malaysia and Thailand
The cases of Malaysia and Thailand --once part of Asia's high-flying "Newly Industrialized Countries" or "NICs" --are illustrative of why some countries are unable to move up the value chain.
For some three decades before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Malaysia had been among the best performing economies in the world, rapidly transforming itself from a backward plantation-based economy with a GDP per capita of around $260 into a prosperous middle-income country with an impressive per capita GDP of just over $8,000. Indeed, Malaysia's leaders proudly announced that by 2020 the country would join the ranks of the upper-income nations. However, Malaysia has not only struggled to recover from the 1997 crisis, its economy now seems inexorably caught in the middle-income trap and unable to make the leap to advanced income status. What went so terribly wrong? There are purely economic factors, including declines in both domestic and foreign investment and a shortage of human capital skills within the country to propel the economy forward. However, as Woo (2009) points out, Malaysia's challenges have been compounded by the country's outdated affirmative action policies, which have negatively impacted economic investment and growth. Specifically, the New Economic Policy (NEP), introduced in 1971 to assist the majority native Malays, or bumiputem, by providing them preferential access via explicit quotas in education, business and employment, including requiring both domestic and foreign companies to employ at least 30 percent Malays, has not only outlived its usefulness, it has become a huge burden on sustained economic growth. The granting of special privileges to a particular group has not only spawned cronyism and rampant corruption, it has also served to underutilize the skills and potential of the Chinese and Indian minorities --who respectively comprise 23.7 percent and 7.1 percent of Malaysia's 28 million citizens. Frustrated and increasingly alienated by the government's discriminatory policies, the Chinese and Indian minorities have been voting with their feet by emigrating in droves. For Malaysia, this drain of both human talent and capital (as the Chinese and Indian minorities are among the best educated and active in the country's commerce), has had a deleterious impact on economic growth --in particular private sector investment, which declined from 32.7 percent of GDP in 1995 to 9.3 percent in 2007 (ibid.). Woo aptly notes:
By focusing too much on the redistribution of income and not enough on the generation of income, NEP rejects meritocracy and institutionalizes racism, thereby preventing full mobilization of human resources (e.g., denying top leadership positions to Chinese and Indians amounts to employing less than 60 percent of the national talent pool). [Having] ethnic quotas on ownership structure either discourages successful Chinese Malaysian firms from tapping the local stock market to fund expansion, or drives Chinese Malaysian firms to move their headquarters to foreign lands. This is why, unlike the Taiwan middle-income country. However, its vast geo-graphical size, and, in particular, the country's "uneven development" may help it escape the middle-income trap (ibid.: 1). Specifically, Malkin and Spiegel suggest that growth in Chinas more-developed provinces may slow to 5.5 percent by the end of this decade, but this decline will be compensated by a more robust 7.5 percent growth in the less-devel-oped provinces (ibid.). Nevertheless, they caution that China should not become complacent, as the country's long-term growth projections show a downward trend. 5 Their analysis (Figure 2 ) highlights both the observed and forecast growth for the two types of regions ("advanced" and "emerging" provinces) since 1990. Clearly，in the developed provinces, the forecast slowdown is rapid. This means that in a few years Chinas growth "will be concentrated primarily in the Chinese interior rather than in the more advanced areas near the coast"（ibid.: 4). Source: Malkin and Spiegel (2012) . Used with permission. 6 Now the bad news: for starters, constrained external demand in the United States and other advanced economies has already (and will continue to) negatively impact Chinas ex-ports. Also, Chinas massive investments in fixed assets are already producing diminishing returns-not only because of over-investment and massive misallocation of resources, but also because as the marginal productivity of capital declines, excessive reliance on factor accumulation only produces diminishing returns. Chinas state-owned enterprises, which dominate the industrial and manufacturing sector, are not only less profitable than many of the small private sector companies, they are also inefficient, with a poor track record for innovation and profitability. Indeed, given the size of its economy, China has very few companies with international reputation. The bulk of Chinas high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms. Similarly, the blessings of demographic dividend), bestowed on China and a number of East Asian economies are a one-time boost. Like Japan before it, now for China the demographic window of opportunity is fast closing (Bosworth 2012 ).
Not only is the large pool of surplus rural labor that provided the engine of Chinas export-led boom fast shrinking, in urban China growth in labor cost, as measured by real wage growth, has been This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Asia Pacific World 4:2 (2013); doi: 10.3167/apw.2013 .040203 ISSN 2042 -6143 (Print) / 2042 -6151 (Online) Copyright © Asia Pacific World. Published online: 01 Sep 2013 levels than implied by our earlier estimates." 4. It is not the case that countries caught in a middle-income trap will not experience any growth.
Rather, growth will continue, but at a pace that is much lower than if these countries had graduated to the high-income level.
5. Malkin and Spiegel's (2012) predictions are based on broad statistical analysis. They divide China's provinces into high-and low-income, and then, using data from a group of selected highgrowth Asian economies (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 7. A common measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient varies between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality). In the case of China, after almost a decade of delay, Beijing finally released annual Gini coefficients statistics going back to 2003 (Lardy and Borst 2013) .
